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ARGUMENT
The Brief of Commissioner Overson contains several statements of facts and legal
argument that need to be clarified to provide this Court with the proper perspective in this
case that was decided in the absence of any discovery. Commissioner Overson overlooks
the fact that there was no discovery in this case. It was decided on summary judgment
without the benefit of a single interrogatory, deposition, admission or produced document.
Commissioner Overson argues that Mr. Mast failed to show documents were not in the
"exclusive control" of Commissioner Overson and therefore discovery was properly denied..
This assertion is not properly focused. No discovery was permitted of any kind from any
source before this case was decided.
The lower court's decision came too, in the face of a Rule 56(f) motion seeking
discovery. The fact that Mr. Mast sought discovery, but was denied that opportunity,
should give this Appellate Court pause.
When there is a legitimate request for discovery, summary judgment should be
postponed and discovery permitted.

As the Utah Supreme Court has previously

emphasized, "[l]itigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court before
judgment can be rendered against them, unless it is obvious from the evidence before the
court that the party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery." Mountain
States Tel. & Tel Co. V. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). More
recently, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[p]rior to the completion of discovery,
however, it is often difficult to ascertain whether the nonmoving party will be able to sustain
its claims. In such a case, summary judgment should generally be denied." Drysdale v.

1

Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). See also, Pepper v. Zion's First Natl
Bank, N.A., 801 P.2d 144, 154 (Utah 1990) (summary judgment premature since
nonmoving party might be able, through additional discovery, to prove different theories of
recovery); Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 315 (Utah 1984) (summary judgment not proper
before nonmoving party has carried "already-begun discovery proceedings to completion");
Auerbach's Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1977) (summary judgment premature
because nonmoving party's discovery not yet complete). On the points raised in the latter
cases, it should be noted that Commissioner Overson's deposition had been noticed at the
time of the summary judgment motion, but Commissioner Overson refused to permit his
deposition to be taken.
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS NEED TO BE CLARIFIED
Commissioner Overson is correct in stating that "the factual context of this case is
rich."1 Unfortunately, much of what is recited and reviewed in his brief as factual recitations
is irrelevant to the dispositive issues in this case. For example, the fact that when
Commissioner Overson acts in his official capacity he may act in both an executive and
legislative function,2 is irrelevant when the statements that are discussed are done at a
press conference held in a public forum place and as part of a personal political campaign.3
The reinstatement history of the Utah corporation, Concerned Taxpayers of Utah ("CTU")4

1

Brief of Appellee Brent Overson at 18

2

Brief of Appellee Brent Overson at 3.

3

Brief of Appellant David Mast at 3.

4

Brief of Appellee Brent Overson at 4.
2

is immaterial when the existence of the corporate status was not challenged in the lower
court and confirmed by affidavits filed on the record.5 Factual disagreements regarding
basic factual matters preclude the Commissiner Overson's efforts to assert defenses in this
case.
B. FACTUAL DISPUTES IN THE RECORD RAISED BY CITIZEN MAST
ARE MATERIAL TO A DEFAMATION CLAIM
Commissioner Overson has mischaracterized the legal significance of the disputed
factual issues that were raised in the record of Citizen Mast's opening brief.
1. A Defamation Claim Remains on the Record
To begin with, Commissioner Overson has overlooked the fact that the record below
indicated an alternate basis for upholding the defamatory language claim of Citizen Mast
was overlooked. Citizen Mast observed in his brief that
[t]he trial court failed to acknowledge in its analysis that it also had before it
the written statements of Commissioner Overson at the press conference
which stated that David Mast was using "the deceptive name of Concerned
Taxpayers of Utah" or "whatever [he] calls [him]self." The phrase "deceptive"
has been recognized in Utah judicial opinions as a state of mind that would
indicate an individiual did not have honesty, integrity, or trustworthiness...
. This is at least an implicit statement that Citizen Mast has engaged in
criminal conduct.6
This further language — raised in Commissioner Overson's own documents before the trial
court — may be viewed as either (1) defamatory in its own right or (2) sufficient when
added to that of the trial court to make both sets of statements defamatory. Assuming that
the previous language ruled upon by Judge Thorne or that noted above is found to be

5

Brief of Appellant David Mast at 12-13, footnote 34.

6

Brief of Appellant Mast at 5,10 (footnotes omitted.)
3

defamatory, the defenses raised by Commissioner Overson may not be sustained based
on the factual record before the court.7
2. Absolute and Privileged Defenses Are Not Applicable
At this stage of the proceedings, the defenses raised by Commissioner Overson are
not relevant either because (1) the defense is not relevant as a matter of law,8 or (2)
disputed facts in the record prevents their application.9
a. Defenses That Do Not Apply As a Matter of Law
Under the undisputed facts of this case, several of the privileged defenses do not
apply as a matter of law.
(i) Defense of Consent
Consent to the publication of defamatory material occurs when an individual
consents to its publication. It is an absolute defense to a subsequent claim of defamation.
Commissioner Overson relies on California precedent10 characterized as case where a
plaintiff "impliedly consented to the subsequent publication by the defendant" as a basis

7

Without waiving the Rule 56(f) U.R.Civ.P. argument already made, Citizen Mast
simply shows on reply that either as a matter of law or because of disputed factual
claims the eight defenses raised by Commissioner Overson do not apply. Assuming
these arguments to be correct, the Rule 56(f) U.R.Civ.P. need not be addressed.
8

An example of a case where the invocation of the absolute privilege associated
with judicial proceedings was found not to apply as a matter of law is Allen v. Ortez, 802
P.2d 1307, 1311-1313 (Utah 1990).
9

An example of a case where disputed facts affecting the application of a
qualified privilege required remand after summary judgment for trial is Russell v.
Thomson Newspapers, 842 P.2d 896, 903 (Utah 1992.)
10

Royerv. Steinberg, 153 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ct. App. 1 st Div. 1979).
4

for asserting this defense.11 Not only is this characterization of the relevant portions of the
case in error,12 but the record below fails to contain any indication by Commissioner
Overson that specific, actual consent was given by Citizen Mast to publish any defamatory
statement regarding the relationship between himself and C.T.U.
Furthermore, even if the publication by C.T.U. in the newspaper implied consent as
to C.T.U. as to matters addressing the South Mountain Development, the public
statements of C.T.U. never claimed or placed at issue the relationship of itself with Citizen
Mast. This information was not contained in either the opening newspaper add of C.T.U.,
any earlier letters, nor the reply advertisement of Commissioner Overson. No where could
this be implied to create consent of Citizen Mast13 to impugn him or his legal and political
action. To be effective as to him,
he must have consented to the particular conduct at issue or to substantially
similar conduct. [Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A 2(b) 1977]. The
extent and content of the alleged consent must therefore be established with
particularity. Once consent is established, it is a defense only if the consent
has not been exceeded. 62 Am. Jr. 2d Privacy § 19 (1972).14

11

Brief of Appellee Brent Overson at 34.

12

"The evidence is uncontradicted that these statements were not made public
until Royer himself gave the letter to a local newspaper. . . . Here, Royer's own
publication of statements charging his involvement in the distribution of bogus
campaign literature rendered such statements absolutely privileged, and his consent
can not be vitiated by a showing of defamatory character." Royer v. Steinberg, supra,
153 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
13

Utah decisions appear to have either not ruled on the privilege of consent,
Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 n.2 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), or observed that its application is to be limited narrowly. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d
556,561 n.4 (Utah 1988).
14

Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Commission, 304 N.W.2d 239, 251 (Iowa

1981).
5

Policy arguments can not create a defense in the absence of a factual foundation.15
(ii) Defense of Expression of Opinion
Neither the context nor text of the Deseret News report of the press conference
(accepted as true for Commissioner Overson) and the written comments prepared by
Commissioner Overson (which were overlooked by Judge Thome) indicate that the
statements were being made as expressions of opinion. Even if they did, the protections
afforded under Article I § 15 of the Utah Constitution do not apply when opinions state or
imply facts that are false and defamatory.16 "Assertions of fact, being objectively verifiable
and much more capable of harming reputation, are not entitled to the same protections
afforded expressions of opinion."17 Thus, as a matter of law, the defense of an expression
of opinion is not available.
(Hi) Qualified privilege of Self-defense
The qualified privilege of self-defense does not apply in this case between Citizen
Mast and Commissioner Overson because it was C.T.U. that published the article to which
Commissioner Overson responded. As a matter of law, self-defense can not be raised
against a party that is not involved in the fray.18
15

Even if "the primary function of the consent defense is to prevent a plaintiff
from "creating" a libelous publication by inviting or inducing indiscretion and thereby
laying the foundation of a lawsuit for his own pecuniary gain," Brief of Appellee
Overson at 35 (citation omitted), the Plaintiff in this case is Citizen Mast not C.T.U., the
entity that placed the advertisement in the newspaper. Thus, the policy is not relevant.
16

West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1015 (Utah 1994).

17

Id.

18

See Borley v. Allison, 63 NE 260 (1902) (denied the privilege when the slander
was not in fact in reply to an accusation of the Plaintiff.)
6

(iv) Protection of Legitimate Interests
Commissioner Overson correctly observes that qualified privilege has been
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court to protect legitimate interests of persons. In a case
where higher level management discussed information regarding drug activity among its
employees, the Court recognized that
[t]he law has long recognized that a publication is conditionally privileged if
made to protect a legitimate interest of the publisher. . . .A conditional
privilege may also protect the legitimate interest of either the recipient or a
third person... The privilege also extends to statements made to advance
a legitimate common interest between the publisher and the recipient of the
publication.19
Commissioner Overson did not have a legitimate interest in making defamatory statements
implying criminal conduct20 regarding the relationship between Citizen Mast and C.T.U.
All laws were being complied with; it was not a matter of public interest.21
b. Disputed Facts Limit Absolute and Conditional Privileges
As this case was decided as a matter of summary judgment, disputed facts in the
record regarding the existence of an absolute defense or malice sufficient to defeat a
qualified privilege require a reversal of Judge Thome's ruling.
(i) Absolute defense of executive or legislative privilege
There remains a basic factual question of whether or not Commissioner Overson
was acting in a personal or public capacity when the defamatory statements were made.
19

Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58-59 (Utah 1991); see also Alford v.
Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).
20

See Opening Brief of Appellant, page 10, footnote 30; page 13, footnotes 38,

21

See Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing Co., 27 P.2d 1 (Utah 1933).

41.

7

Citizen Mast has pointed out that this factual issue was specifically commented on by
Judge Thome during the hearing.22 Commissioner Overson has agreed that the discussion
arose regarding the claim of executive privilege.23 There is a question of fact as to whether
or not Commissioner Overson was performing his public duties (working as a
Commissioner) or privately exercising constitutional rights (campaigning for office) when
the defamatory information was communicated. As such, under the record at present, this
absolute privilege does not apply.
(ii). Disputed Issue of Malice Defeats Application of Privileged Defenses
Generally, the issue of malice is ordinarily a factual issue.24 The defamatory
allegations regarding C.T.U. and Citizen Mast was a matter of public record, of verifiable
fact, or at a minimum placed at issue by the affidavits submitted by Citizen Mast.25
Indeed, the record of Commissioner Overson establishes the separate nature of C.T.U.
and Citizen Mast.26

Whether or not Commissioner Overson's defamatory declarations

regarding Citizen Mast are judged on a negligence standard for a private person or an
actual malice standard for a public figure,27 because of the actual knowledge of
Commissioner Overson of the legal and separate nature of C.T.U., and the implication of

22

Appellants' Opening Brief on Appeal at 7-8.

23

Brief of Appellee Overson at 19-20

24

Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1983).

25

See Affidavit of Randall Doyle H 6 (Rp. 384), Affidavit of Scott Simons H 5 (Rp.

26

See A 0008 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp. 47).

27

Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, 842 P.2d 896, 903 (Utah 1992).

273.)

8

criminal conduct,28 a factual question is raised as to whether or not the statements were
made by "an improper motive such as a desire to do harm or that the defendant did not
honestly believe his statements to be true."29
In addition to counter-defense of malice, other factual disputes negate the existence
of two other qualified privileges asserted by Commissioner Overson. First, "[t]he "public
interest" privilege is applicable, at least, when the public health and safety are involved and
when there is a legitimate issue with respect to matters involving the expenditure of public
funds."30 While this may be true as to the South Mountain Project, the legal relationship
between Citizen Mast and C.T.U. was not a matter of public interest. Second, the
defamatory language implying criminal conduct, was insufficient to make Citizen Mast a
public figure like C.T.U.31
(Hi) Governmental Immunity Does Not Apply
Commissioner Overson's record is not complete enough to demonstrate that as a
matter of law Commissioner Overson is protected by the Governmental Immunity Act.
For reasons outlined as to why he is not entitled to absolute executive and legislative
immunity, there is a serious question of fact as to whether or not his defamatory
statements regarding C.T.U. and Citizen Mast were made "during the performance of the

28

See Opening Brief of Appellant, page 10, footnote 30; page 13, footnotes 38,

41.
29

Direct Import Buyer's Association v. KSL, Inc., 538 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah
1975) affirmed as to character defamation 572 P.2d 692, 696 (Utah 1977).
30

Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 978 (Utah 1981).

31

Id at 972-973.
9

employee's duties within the scope of employment, or under the color of authority."32 Until
this issue is resolved, there can be no showing that the Act even applies.

C. OTHER FACTUAL MATTERS RAISED BY OVERSON'S BRIEF:
There are other matters raised by the brief of Commissioner Overson which distort
the picture presented in this appeal. They are not relevant, and should not be considered.
However, in light of the fact that Commissioner Overson's brief attempts to portray the
background with distortions, comment upon those matters is necessary. It is the position
of Appellant, however, that these matters need not concern the Court.
The Concerned Taxpayers of Utah is an entity which was formed to address
concerns of Utah taxpayers. It has been involved in such diverse issues as the "union
only" contracting for the Salt Palace expansion. Commissioner Overson opposed this
proposal, and solicited various groups to assist him in his opposition. Among the groups
which filed suit to prevent the "union only" contracting, was the Association of General
Contractors and C.T.U. Commissioner Overson met with C.T.U. in connection with that
litigation. He requested the meeting and asked C.T.U. to join in the litigation. C.T.U.
believed it to be an issue affecting Utah taxpayers and agreed to join the suit. During the
suit representatives of C.T.U., including Mr. Mast met with Commissioner Overson to
discuss the litigation. Accordingly, Commissioner Overson knew of C.T.U.'s corporate
existence, and knew they were a separate entity from Mr. David Mast. Despite this,
Commissioner Overson made statements to the contrary in his press conference33.

!

U.C.A. § 63-30-4(3)(a).

[

A Deseret News article about this is attached as Appendix Exhibit G.
10

There was a second matter on which Commissioner Overson contacted C.T.U.
requesting assistance. Commissioner Overson opposed the proposed light rail system.
C.T.U. also opposed light rail. Commissioner Overson asked for, and received, C.T.U.'s
support in opposing the light rail system. Again, he understood the separate, corporate
existence of C.T.U.
As to the open meeting referred to on page 5 of the Respondent's brief, there was
a public meeting. However, the meeting was called with less than 48 hours advance notice
to the public. Despite this lack of advance scheduling, the public came. The public was
unanimous in their opposition to the acquisition of the South Mountain golf course. A copy
of the Deseret News article on the meeting is attached to this brief. (Appendix attachment
A.)
Although it is contended that Commissioner Overson was acting in his official
capacity on page 32 of Respondent's brief, there is information to the contrary. The
County agreed to provisionally pay Mr. Overson's attorney's fee bill, reserving the question
for later determination as to whether he acted in his official capacity. A copy of the minutes
and resolution is attached to this brief. (Appendix attachment B.)
Respondent argues, on page 7 of its brief that there was a delay in producing
documents by the County due to the extensive nature of the GRAMA request. That is not
accurate. The fact is, the request was not extensive, nor did it produce much in the way
of a response from the County. In addition, the "delay" experienced was due to the County
redacting almost all of the information from the few materials provided. Attached to this
brief is an example of the materials produced by the County. (Appendix attachment C.)

11

C.T.U. was concerned about the purchase of the South Mountain golf course
because it was a bad deal. It was not worth the amount to be paid. (Appendix attachment
D.) Further, C.T.U. learned that instead of the advertised price, of $8 million, the County
was intending to bond for $13 million. (Appendix attachment E.) Accordingly, the C.T.U.
believed this a matter of some import to taxpayers and involved themselves in the public
dialog. It was them, and not Mr. Mast who ran the advertisement. (Appendix attachment
F.) It was them, and not Mr. Mast who engaged in the public discourse. It was not
appropriate for Commissioner Overson to lash out at Mr. Mast for the actions of C.T.U.
It is also a fact that C.T.U. had sufficient reason for their concerns on this proposed
acquisition.
Citizen Mast filed a defamation lawsuit seeking in the alternative money damages
or a public apology. In this appeal, he is again being faced with disparaging comments
about his motivation, his character and his integrity. The brief of Respondent is a
privileged communication. But it nevertheless continues the character assassination of Mr.
Mast.
The C.T.U. has opposed the light rail issue. It has been involved in the Olympic bid
issue. It has been involved in litigation to save taxpayers of Utah money, when the cause
warrants it. Mr. Mast is a concerned citizen who belongs to, but does not control the
C.T.U. It is not his "alter ego" which he uses whenever he wants to "call himself"
something other than by his real name. Commissioner's suggestion to that effect from the
forum of the County Commission chambers, and in front of local media outlets who then
reported it entitle Citizen Mast to resort to the courts for a correction. He is entitled to the

12

apology he seeks. Alternatively, he is entitled to have a jury decide he has been defamed
by the unwarranted accusations of Commissioner Overson.
Commissioner Overson asserts an entitlement to immunity for his actions which, if
granted, President Clinton would envy. A unanimous Supreme Court recently determined
that the President is not above the law. Neither should be Commissioner Overson.
CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in dismissing Citizen Mast's complaint before any discovery
was permitted. The factual disputes which existed, even without permitting discovery,
prevent summary judgment. There are no independent bases for sustaining the decision
of the lower court. This Court should reverse and remand this matter for a decision on its
merits.
DATED this 7th day of May, 1998.
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE

IJ
O^n^erSnuffer
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant David Mast
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Deseret News Archives

Start new search f Search help + Web Edition front page

Archives*^
Deseret News Archives,
Saturday, April 20, 1996

GOLFERS FLAY COUNTY PLAN TO BUY LINKS
$8 million price tag is called double what the course is worth
By Marianne Funk, Staff Writer

Salt Lake County announced its plans to buy the South Mountain Golf Course in
Draper with the pride and fanfare of a hole in one.
But angry golfers and taxpayers decry the move as nothing but a worm-burner for
taxpayers.
A Salt Lake County Golf Advisory Board member acknowledged that the county
offered to buy the course partly to bail out troubled developers who realize they can't
run it profitably themselves. "Someone's in distress," acknowledged board member
Craig Moody at this week's public hearing over the proposed purchase of the course.
A small, brutally candid group of county-resident golfers told the county officials
that the $8 million purchase is such a bad idea that county bosses must be getting
something under the table to even consider it.
"There is something that stinks about this," said golfer Max Sherner.
"This deal does not look right. Something is not being said here," said golfer and
golf businessman Jimmy Blair.
The county is planning to pay a rumored $8 million for the completed course on the
east end of the 1,700-home South Mountain development in the foothills overlooking
Draper.
The county needs the course to meet growing demand for another public course in
the southwest part of the valley, said Moody.
The criticism: South Mountain developers are already required to build and operate
the course as part of a deal with Draper city that allowed them to cram so many
homes onto the west end of their property.
Under the planned-unit development requirements with Draper, the developers must
also make the golf course open to the public.
So, why should the county buy the course? critics demanded. And why pay $8
million when it costs roughly $4 million to build golf courses?
Blair cited the cost to construct area 18-hole golf courses in the past five years:
Wingpointe at the airport, $3.3 million in 1991; Mountain Dell in Parleys Canyon. $4
million in 1991; West Ridge in West Valley City, $4.5 million in 1991; Riverbend in
Riverton, $4.2 million in 1994, and Old Mill at Knudsen Corner was recently bid at
$4.3 million.
"We are paying for two golf courses and getting one," Blair said.
The additional $4 million would be for the land, Moody said. County officials have
refused to say how much they offered for the golf course, but Moody and others
repeatedly used the $8 million figure.
The land the course sits on is worth the additional $4 million, Moody said. "If you'll
sell me that land today for $4 million, I'll take it," he said.
But developers already made their money off the land when they were allowed to
crowd almost 2,000 homes onto the rest of their property by using the golf course to

f<*
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meet open space requirements, said Bob Christiansen, a spokesman for Concerned
Taxpayers for Utah.
Let the developers run their course and keep the course on the public tax rolls
instead of draining taxpayer resources to buy it, suggested retired economist Reed
Smith.
Despite the criticism, the county officials believe most of the public supports the
purchase, said David Marshall, assistant director of the Salt Lake County Division of
Community Support Services. "We've only heard complaints from the five or six
people here today."
The hearing was the only scheduled hearing on the purchase, he said.
© 1997 Deseret News Publishing Co.
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COUNTY COMMISSIONER MINUTES
November 20, 1996
COMMISSIONER
RANDY HORIUCHI:
COMMISSIONER
MARY CALLAGHAN:
MR. DAVID
MARSHALL:

COMMISSIONER
HORIUCHI:
MR. MARSHALL:

COMMISSIONER
HORIUCHI:

MR. MARSHALL:

Chairman what do you have t o say on 5 2? I
t h i n k we ought t o j u s t go ahead and p a s s t h a t
as i s .
Okay,

formal motion.

Why don't you just go ahead and look through 5 2.
Commissioner, if you're going to do that, 5 2 may
be done with reservation of rights because of the
nature of the complaints made by Mr. Mast against
Commissioner Overson. Some of them seem to relate
to his official function. Some relate to that
article that was in the newspaper which was
identified as being paid by his political
committee and there are some questions there, so
if you're going to adopt that now, you might want
to do it with a reservation of rights.
What does that mean?
That means that the defense would be provided but
depending. It's kind of a cart before the horse
question in legalities. We do not know whether
Commission Overson when he did whatever he did and
whether it's ever proven. We don't know if he did
that within the scope of his employment or not.
I guess what I'm saying here is we ought to
probably cross it. I mean, this only is approving
that we basically hire an attorney to defend him
in this suit and I guess what I'm saying is if
there's going to reservation of rights we ought to
get to it if it becomes applicable. So I'd just
say let's go ahead and adopt 5 2 and then at such
time as we may have to deal with the issue of
either culpability or whatever, we can, you know,
handle it then.
Okay, and it is part of the problem. I mean, you
don't know whether or not he is acting within the
scope of his employment until the judge a year
from now says he is or isn't. In the meantime,
you have the cost of incurred . . .

COMMISSIONER
EXHIBIT
%
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8015761960

NELSNSNUFFER&DAHLE

HORIUCHI:

But here again, what I'm saying is if in the end
it ends up finding that there may be reservation
of rights it might apply then* It would take a
second vote later on and I guess what I'm saying
to you is we'll just go ahead and approve 5 2 as
is and if we come to that bridge . . .

MR. MARSHALL:

I just wanted to make the commission aware

COMMISSIONER
HORIUCHI:

MR. MARSHALL:

Specifically then by your motion the Commission is
approving outside counsel hiring. I chink you
might want to make that.
I don't want to belabor this too much, but that's
the request that's 5.2 in its wording says to the
County Attorney to defend him and it doesn't ask
for outside counsel. So we got to face up to that
also-

COMMISSIONER
BRENT OVERSON: Let me just take a look at it real quick. There's
a space that says Salt Lake County defend me, I
don't get the point whether it's the County
Attorney*
MR. ROBERT S,
Either do I. I'm not sure exactly whac
HOWELL:
Commissioner Overson was thinking what he wanted.
COMMISSIONER
And I think if the issue probably was an outside
HORIUCHI:
counsel, but should we add that in Mr. Marshall?
(inaudible) Okay, let's add that- The intent is
to hire outside counsel.
COMMISSIONER
11 is payment of bills, 12 Salt Lake County
CALLAGHAN:
personnel CP4 actions.
S: \USGENEFA\OVTRSONWrNUTES.N20
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Mr- Howell stated that it means the defense would be provided, but
it ia kind of a cart before the horse question in legalities. They do not know
whether Commission Overs on, whan ha did whatever ha did and is ever proven, did
that within tha scope of his employment or not.
Canmissionar Horiuchi stated that this is only approving that they
hire an attorney to defend him in this suit and if there is going to be a
reservation of rights, they ought to get to it if it becomes applicable. He says
that thay should go ahead and adopt this and then at such time as they may have
to deal with an issue of either culpability or whatever, they can handle it then.
Mr. Howell stated that this is part of the problem - they don't know
whether or not he is acting within the scope of his employment until the judge,
a year from now, says he is or he isn't. In the meantime they have the coats
that are incurred.
Commissioner Horiuchi stated that if in the end it ends up finding
that there might be a reservation of rights, it would take a separate vote later
on and what he is saying is for them to go ahead and approve this as is and if
thay coma to that bridge...
Mr. David Marshall, Community 6 Support Services Associate Director/
stated that specifically, by their motion, the Commission is approving outside
counsel being hired.
Mr. Howell stated that the request end it's wording says for the
County Attorney to defend him, it doesn't ask for outside counsel.
Comal a a loner Horiuchi looked at the letter and stated that basically
it says for "Salt Lake County to defend roeM and he doesn't get the point, whether
it is tha County Attorney or...,
Mr. Howell stated that ha wasn't sure what Commissioner Overson was
thinking at that time.
Casnaisalonar Horiuchi indicated that the issue probably was outside
counsel. He asked Mr. Marshall if they should add that in (yea) the intent is
to hire outside counsel.
Roll was called approving the request, authorizing Commissioner
Overson to affect same, showed that both Commiaeloners voted "Aye."
•••

•••

•••

• ••

•••

Mr. Paul J. Lund, Chief Deputy Assessor/ submitted a letter
requesting parmission to allow monetary compensation to Kevin Jacobs. Division
Director of Administration a Fiscal Management, who was recently reassigned to
Divieion Director of Motor Vehicles, for 85 hours of compensatory time. Mr.
Jacobs has accumulated 85 hours of unforseen compensatory time due to the change
of hla position and extraordinary performance under unusual circumstances. At
this very critical time, the Assessor's Office is not in a position to allow Mr.
Jacobs to take the compensatory time. It would be awarded at straight time.
Roll was called denying the request, notifying Mr. t«und of same,
showed that both Commissioners voted "Aye."
••*

•••

• ••

•••

•••

Mr. Romney M. Stewart, Solid Waste Management Director, submitted the
reaommandatione made by the Bait Lake Valley Solid Waste Management Council at
its September 20, 1996, meeting.
Roll was called approving the recommendations, authorizing
Stewart to affaot same, showed that both Commissioners voted "Aye."

7-1

Mr.

Mr. Rogar B, Hillam, Raal Eatata Saotion Managar, aubmittad a lattar
raquaating a partial faa take for proparty ownad by William Q. a Julia H,
Eckitrora, 13836 South 2200 Waat/2:C -- Roaa Creek Corridor Project. Fair market
value has bean sat.
Roll was called approving tha requeet, authorizing Mr. Hi11am to
af foot mmme, ahowad that both Commissioner a voted "Aye."
•••

•••

•••

• ••

• ••

Mr. Rogar B. Hillam, Real Estate Section Manager, submitted the
following Rasolution t2400 and a Permanent Construction Basement and a Temporary
1896
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5606 PGA Blvd.. Suite 111
Palm Beach Gardens. Florida 33416
Telephone: (407) 624-0808 Fax: (407) 624-4227
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GENE
BATES
G O L F

D E S I G N

SOUTH MOUNTAIN GOLF COURSE
Draper, Utah

The cost estimate prepared by Gene Bates Golf Design for the South Mountain Golf Course property is
based on averages of bids submitted for the other work in Salt Lake County. Where items on the South
Mountam cost estimate do not correlate to any line item in the die other projects we reviewed, a judgment was
made based upon experience to determine if the estimate was accurate.
Some quantities were not available in any of the materials we received In ihcsc cases we either did
take-offfiromthe plans or estimated the quantities based upon our study of the plans. Every effort was made
to accurately estimate the construction cost for the South Mountain Golf Course based on the information we
received.

SCHEDULE OF BID ITEMS

Item

Description

Unit

1.

Mobilization

L.S.

2.

Survey and Staking

L.S.

Est Qty.

Unit Price

*It is assumed that his price is sufficient.
Please confirm with county surveyor to determine
an accurate estimate for this item.
a. Erosion Control

L.S.
^Quantities of erosion control materials are
not provided and it is assumed that this
price is sufficient.

b. Clearing and Grubbing

AC.

5606 PGA Blvd., Suite 111
Palm Beach Gardens. Florida 33418
Telephone: (407) 624-0808 Fax: [407] 624-4227

7-S>

Total

Item

Description

Unit

Est Qty.

Unit Price

*The unit price given in the original South Mountain
cost estimate appears to be low. The original bid was
used with an inflation factory of 10% to adjust to 1996
prices. This amount is only an estimate and should be
verified with a local contractor.

*No line item from other bids we reviewed bid correlates
with this line item. It is assumed that this bid
amount is sufficient
8.

Fairway Drainage

L.F.

a- 6" Solid HDPE Smoothwall Pipe
b. 8? Solid HDPE Smoothwall Pipe
c. 10" Solid HDPE Smoothwall Pipe
d. 12" Solid HDPE Smoothwall Pipe
e. '15" Solid HDPE Smoothwall Pipe
£ 12" Cast Iron Inlet Grate
g. 18" Cast Iron Inlet Grate
L 24" Cast Iron Inlet Grate
•These quantities are actual take-offs by Gene Bates
Golf Design based upon our recommendation of increased
fairway drainage pipe size.
9.

Culverts

^

Total

Item

Description

b. 30" Pipe
c. 36" Pipe
& Headwall/Rip Rap

Unit

Est Qty.

Unit Price

Total

Ea.
*A11 sizing of 24"-36!t must be done by an engineer.
Culvert pipe size has been estimated for cost
estimating purposes.

10.

Water Features

L.S.

11.

Wood Pole Walls

L.F.

12.

Bridges

L.F.
*The South Mountain plans do not show any bridges.
From our review, however, it appears that some bridges
are necessary based upon the severity of the topography.
The original quantity in the South Mountain bid appears
to be sufficient to construct the bridges necessary for

this project vHHHHH^HHmHIHilHIHH
The estimated unit price given in this cost estimate is our
estimate for a wood bridge on this site.
13.

Rock Walls/Retaining Walls/Rip Rap
a. 4' High Rock Wall
b. 6' High Rock Wall
c. Rip rap

L.F.
L.F.
S.F.
*Rock walls were not quantified in the plans. The bid
quantities provided seemed low so we quantified the lengths
of the rock walls on the plans and assumed that approximately
half would be 6 feet high.

14.

Irrigation System

L.S.
•System designed by'Dale Winchester and pricing appears
accurate.

-ri

Item

Description

Unit

15.

Lake Sealing (30 mil PVC)

Sq.Ft.

16.

Lake Shoreline

L.F.

17.

Lake Overflow and Transfer
System

L.S.

18.

Topsoiling

Cu.Yd.

19.

Greens (USGA w/o choker layer)

Sq.Ft

Est. Qty.

Unit Price

•Greens square footage is based upon Gene Bates
Golf Design's recommendation of reducing green
size by 800 sq. ft. per green. The smaller greens
will average 6,237 square feet each; the addition of
the practice greens at 15,400 square feet gives the
totaL
20.

Bunkers (inc. drainage)

S.F.

21.

Tees

Sq.Ft

22.

Cart Path (8' Wide Concrete)

L.F.

a. 6" High Concrete Curb

LJF.
•Curbing was not quantified in the South Mountain plansl
The estimate was derived by quantifying the amount of
curbing shown on the plans.

23.

Seedbed Preparation

AC.
*This quantity includes tee surrounds, green surrounds,
fairways, roughs, intermediate and far roughts. This
quantity may be high, but we have no way of knowing the
correct quantity of area to be prepared for seeding
without knowing more about the site.

24.

Fumigation

S.F.

i^

Total

Item

Description

Unit

25.

Pre-emergence

AC.

26.

Sod

Sq.Yd

27.

Fairways
a. Seeding
b. Sprigging

28.

30.

AC

S-F.

Tees
a. seeding
b. sprigging

S.F.

Transition Areas
a. Intcnnediate Rough.
b. Native Glass Seed

AC.
AC.

31.

Fertilization

L.S.

32.

Soil Amendments

L.S.

33.

Landscaping and Re-establish
Native Trees

L.S.

Unit Price

Total
0.00

Greens
a. Seeding
b. Sprigging

29.

Est Qty.

TOTAL:

1A

EXHIBIT D: COST ANALYSIS FOR GOLF COURSE

"bO

Buying Draper Golf Course a Bad Deal, Says Golf Professional
Byline: By Jon Ure THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE

04/17/96
A 20-year golf professional who builds and operates courses claims Salt Lake
County will rip off taxpayers if it acquires an 18-hole, $8 million golf course on
Draper's South Mountain.
Jim Blair, co-owner of Mulligan's Golf and Games in Ogden and Riverton, said he
will oppose the deal at a public hearing on the proposal today at noon in the Meadow
Brook Golf Course clubhouse, 4197 S. 1300 West.
He has joined with Dave Mast, chairman of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, in
opposing the purchase. Both say South Mountain's $8 million price tag is ridiculous,
and by their reckoning, the county should pay no more than $4 million.
Mast's group has filed a lawsuit to prevent the transaction. He said South Mountain's
developers and the Salt Lake County Commission are engaged in a sweetheart deal
and complained that his freedom of information requests for county and South
Mountain documents regarding the proposed purchase are being illegally thwarted.
The $8 million figure does not include a clubhouse on the course in the middle of
South Mountain's 1,700 residences. Blair and Mast said other golf courses in the
area, including those superior to South Mountain's, cost half that much.
And if South Mountain is donating the land, why will it cost the county the whole $8
million? asked Blair. Blair also wanted to know why the county should own and
operate it.
"I'm a concerned taxpayer and they're making a killing on this deal. People
shouldn't be retiring on this. In makes no sense. That golf course is worth between
$3 million and $4 million."
"Its not like the commissioners wet out and cut a deal," Overson said. South
Mountain's plan was picked from a list of three by the county's Golf Advisory
Board. And since the county approached South Mountain, competitive bids were
never even a notion, added South Mountain developer Terry Deihl.
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RICHARDSON APPRAISAL
506 South Main, Suite 100 Bountiful, Utah 84010 (801) 299-1966 Fax (801) 298-3438

FAX: October 18,1996 - 5 pages

Attn.: David Mast FAX# 523-2283

RE: Golf course information as requested per conversation on October 15,1996.

Dear Dave:
The following sale comparables are provided to assist in your discussions with the county
concerning the South Mountain golf course sale. This is the same information I provided to
Mamie Funk of the Deseret News several weeks ago.

The following points are

emphasized:
1. Specific sales data should not be published or publicly discussed unless you obtain
direct permission from either the seller or buyer of the transaction, This is more a matter of
courtesy than anything else. THK Associates, Inc. is the source for some of this data. They
should be able to provide phone numbers for either the buyer or the seller. Their phone
number is (303) 770-7201. It may be quicker, however, just to contact the local operators.
Sale Nos. 6, 7, and 8 involve either West Bountiful or St. George cities.
2. The point of providing these sales is to emphasize the difference between market value
and value-in-use (often defined as cost) as we discussed. The higher end country club
sales are included to show how out-of-line the $7.9 million offer was as it concerned a
property with fewer amenities than the superior country club buildings, pools, etc.

My

understanding is South Mountain is to be a public daily fee course. The comparables which
should be focused on are therefore Sale Nos. 5, 6, and 9 and, to a lesser extent, Sale Nos.
7 and 8.
Without getting too technical, I would hope it is apparent in a general sense that the
indicated sale prices for these public courses of $2,050,000 to $4,180,000 do not remotely
support the $7,900,000 number the county was offering, claim of support to the contrary.
You may remember my discussion with Roger Hillam on August 29, 1996 in which he

-bV
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admitted he understood the difference between market value and value-in-use, and that the
county had not obtained market value but a "developmental value" (i.e. cost or value-inuse). He inferred that there were no sale comparables in the report, but then added that
even if there were they would not be available for viewing to the public (one of my main
motivations for calling him was to discover actual sales data for comparable purposes in my
own work).

The strong inference in the county's ad that independent market value

appraisals have been obtained therefore appears to be grossly inaccurate. Also, Mr. Hillam
said only one appraisal, not multiple appraisals, were obtained. The county's full page
declaration of "facts" {Deseret News, Aug. 26, 1996, p. A7) stated the later.

Poor

communication is the problem here at best. I won't opine what the worst scenario(s) are....
3. You will notice that the sales dates are "older" if you are used to the residential appraisal
tradition of seeing sale comparables within a six month period only. As you can appreciate,
this type of property does not sale often in the open market, and these are the latest sales
of which I am aware in this market. The important point to focus on is not the sale date but
the quality of the income which was purchased. Sale No. 9 is the best example, as it is the
highest price sale of the public courses (I'm picking the "best" for argument's sake), one of
the newest sales, and is one of the nicer local courses. Similar superlatives are being
applied for South Mountain, so such is assumed for argument's sake.

Park Meadows

indicated green fees of $35 and annual rounds of 23,000 at time of sale. Had the county
continued with their proposed green fees of $20-$24, you can readily see that the number of
rounds would need to be extremely high in order to induce the same type of buyer to
purchase South Mountain.

Even in a random and imperfect market such as this, the

numbers and green fees being quoted show no consistency at all with what has actually
taken place in the past.
4. It is also unclear why or how a different prospective owner than the county is reportedly
projecting up to triple the green fees compared to the county's projection simply by a
change of ownership, as reported in the Deseret News. The private sector buyer is
projecting fees in the $50 to $60 range while the county claims fees will be near $20 to $24
if the county operates the course. Doesn't the market have something to say about that, or
would the new owner also change the physical aspect of the course from what the county
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was going to purchase; i.e., by adding a clubhouse and/or additional amenities after the
purchase? If so, then the comparison then becomes like apples to oranges.
The county can't ethically have it both ways: either they are competent in maximizing
potential income and the other potential buyer (from the private sector, no less) isn't as
"competent" and has unrealistically projected unattainable fees OR the county must be put
in a position of subsidizing the operation of the course ( a luxury no private sector buyer
would have) since green fees would be economically insufficient to justify the purchase
price paid. The county denies that taxpayers would need to subsidize operation per the
newspaper articles I've read.
Having said the above, I wish it to be known I have no agenda other than that people tell the
truth. I am not a golfer, nor do I live in the Draper area. I personally don't care if a golf
course is built or purchased or not.

I do care if governmental agencies who have

stewardship to manage public funds are competent and / or truthful in doing so. I have no
financial or any other type of interest in any of these proceedings. I have not met any of the
parties involved in person. I am only responding to what I read and hear in the media, and
felt an ethical responsibility to pass on what I know concerning this matter. Thanks for your
interest in this matter.

Sincerely,

(LI
V. Clark Richardson

1>H

bALtb
Sale No.
Name.
Location:

1
Plum Creek
193 Apricot Way

2
Lone Iree Country Club
9808 Sunningdale Blvd

3
Meridian Golf Club
972 So Meridian

Glenmoor Country Club

Arrowhead

110 Glenmoor Or.

10850 Sundown Trail

Castle Rock. Colorado

Littleton. Colorado

Englewood, Colorado

Cherry Hills Village. CO.

Littleton. Colorado
Mar-88
$3,530,000

Sep-91

Nov-91

Jut-94

$4,600,000
cash

$4,675,000

$5,200,000

Sales Oate:
Sales Price-

Mar-86
$3,500,000

Sale Terms:
Seller
Buyer:

cash
JPM. Inc.
Plum Creek Partners

Manlyn C Green, public trustee

Private Club

Private Club (d)

Type of Course:
No. of Holes:
Par
Slope Rating:
Course Acres:
Total Acres:
No. of 18-Hote Rounds Played.
18-Hole Green Fees (weekend):
18-Hole Cart Fees:
Initiation Fees:
Annual Dues:
Clubhouse Size (sq.ft.):
Maintenance Bldg Size (sq.ft.):
Age at Sale (years):
Food & Beverage:
Other Amenities:
Comments:

So. SurtHXtoao Parfcs A Htacr+mtkm

Private Club

Daily Fee

$30 00 (a)
$20.00 (a)
n/a
$1,600

237.3
240.0
20.000
n/a
n/a
$1,000
$1,800

116.36
119.23
n/a
n/a
n/a
$17,500 (b)
$3,180 (b)

45.158
5.195

1.800
3.500

43.855

6

6

yes
4 tennis courts, pool
15 guest suites in clubhouse; sold for $3,500,000
in 1985 without the clbhse.

no
3 practice holes
Bar & grill added after
sale, annual corporate
fees became $2,100.

72
129

25.000

yes
2 tennis courts

cash
Arrowhead Golf Corporation
American Golf Corporation

cash

72
134

18
72
127
160.0
189 1

$1,500
39.444
3.500
4

Private Club
18

Glenmoor Title Holding Co.
Glenmoor Country Club
18
71
134

18

125.0
144.9
24,000
n/a
n/a
n/a

cash
Meridian Assoaates West
Central Sport Co. LTD

8.236
10

yes
4 tennis courts, pool

18
70
134
160.0

J>
M
(f)

35,000

J>

$57.00
w/ green fee

r
o
n
T\
M

3.500
smart
14
yes
none

O

m

oo

Price/Hole:

$194,444

$259,722

Price/Course Acre:

$28,000

$255,556
$28,750

$19,701

$288,889
$44,689

$196,111

$ 146

$184

$234

n/a

$101

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

24

Greens Fee Multiplier (j):

7)

180 0

Units of Comparison

Price/18-Hole Rounds Played:

TJ
D

$22,063
00

w

Footnotes
a) Unclear whether these were fees at time of sale or not. nonresident green lees at $40
b) Excludes initiation fees of S30.000 corporate. $5,000 nonresident, and $2,000 social, and annual nonresident and s o a a l fees of $1,380.
c) Effective dale of appraisal
d) Converted lo public dub after the sate
e) Sate included an exchange clause w h c h allows seller to exchange a course they plan to construct in the vicmdy for the Sunbrook course
The sellers plan to then convert this course lo a private dub
0 Excludes $500 soaal membership and $7 500 p membership
<j) I *rJudes $l?0fyi irrigation assessment annual soaal dues are X510
It) Includes 8.507 sq fl lowor level lui carl sloraqc
0 I lutihoti'.f .Hid ni.iuili'ii.iiii.r tHi'Miiig*, will l»o IH*V»
|| I "..I f / I ' t t H r t t K f'l.ltf«-<f ( 1 I W M | I < | llV I .««•«•!» I .-.- .1- •.,!««•• $\\\

III «_. l \ . «•! •••• t t f l t l t t 1t«W lltfMtOllv HI. kl«|l <! Vtfttl* tt «• <|M*«-M t| •

W
00

Safp No
Name
Location
Sales Date
Sales Pnce
Sale Terms
Seller
Buyer

6""

Type of Course
No of Holes
Par
Slope Rating
Course Acres
Total Acres
No of 18-Hole Rounds Played
18 Hole Green Fees (weekend)
18-Hole Cart Fees
nitiadon Fees
Vnnual Dues
Clubhouse Sue (sq ft)
4amtenance B/dg Size (sq ft )
.ge at Sale (years)
ood 6. Beverage
•ther Amenities
omments

Spring Meadows
1201 No 1100W
West Ootintiful, Utah
Apr-88
$835,000
cash
Greg 8. Stuart Smith
West Bountiful City
Daily Fee

9
36
n/a
640
n/a
14 000
$1000
n/a

1 250
small
31
yes
none
Rounds increased to
36.000 after 1 year, city
later -added 9 holes

GOLF C O UR S € SALES
7
8
Sunbn>ok
Southgnte
2240 W SunbfOokOf
1975 So Tonaquint Or
St George, Utah
St George. Utah
Aug 90
Sep-91
$3,408,000
cash (e)
Sunbrook Lid
City of St George
Municipal
18
72
129
148 0
n/a
55.000
$35 50
w/ green fees

1.200
shed
new
snack bar
none
Sale did not include the
mamt bldg as the city
constructed it

9
Park Meadows
200 Meadows Dr.
Park City. Utah

$2,050,000
cash
Herbert B Stratlon
City of St George

Sep-91
$4,180,000
cash
Valley Bank & Trust
Marsaru Yokouchi

Municipal
18
70
119
127 31
n/a
70 000
$17 50
$9 50

Daily Fee
18
72
n/a
1700
195 0
23 000
$35 00
n/a

4 320
shed
20
yes
none
Seller purchased in 7/88 at
$2,062,554. had financial
difficulty at time of sale

n/a
n/a
8
yes
none
Operated as pnvate club
until bank took over in
1988

*& jQf QQWdnSQQ
•rice/Hole

$92,778

$189 333

'nee/Course A a e

$113,889

$13 047

$23,027

$60
60

$16,102

$232,222
$24,588

$62

$29

$182

24

1 7

52

nce/18 Hole Rounds Played
•reens Fee Multiplier (j)

EXHIBIT E: COUNTY FUNDING FOR $13 MILLION
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RESOLUTION NO.
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DECLARATION OF OFFICIAL INTENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
TO REIMBURSE ITSELF FROM BOND PROCEEDS FOR CERTAIN
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES FOR THE ACQUISITION AND
COMPLETION OF THE SOUTH MOUNTAIN GOLF COURSE AND
RELATED FACILITIES; ESTABLISHING THE MAXIMUM
PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF SUCH EXPENDITURES AND
AUTHORIZING INCIDENTAL ACTION
WHEREAS, Salt Lake County (the "County") expects to incur significant costs
for the acquisition and completion of the South Mountain Golf Course and Related
Facilities to be located at the Southern end of the County (the "Project"); and
WHEREAS, the County has determined that it intends tofinanceall or a portion
of the cost of the Project with the proceeds of obligations of the County or its Municipal
Building Authority (the "Authority"), the interest on which is excludable from gross
income for federal income tax purposes ("tax-exempt bonds"); and
WHEREAS, no costs of the Project to be reimbursed were paid more than 60
days prior to the date of this Resolution, other than preliminary expenditures (not
exceeding 20% of the aggregate issue price of the tax-exempt bonds issued to finance the
Project), provided that such preliminary expenditures shall not include costs of land
acquisition or site preparation or other costs of construction or acquisition of the Project;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS FOLLOWS:
Section 1.
Declaration of Official Intent to Finance Capital Expenditures:
Maximum Authorized Debt. The County hereby declares its intention and reasonable
expectation to use proceeds of tax-exempt bonds (the "Reimbursement Bonds") of the
County or the Authority to reimburse itself for expenditures for costs of the Project. The
County intends that the Reimbursement Bonds are to be issued, and the reimbursements
made, by the later of 18-months after the payment of the costs or after the Project is
placed in service, but in any event, no later than three years after the date the original
expenditure was paid. The County anticipates that the maximum principal amount of the
Bonds which will be issued to finance the Project (including the Reimbursement Bonds)
will not exceed $13,000,000.
Section 2.
Nature of Project Costs. The costs of the Project consists entirely
of capital expenditures or costs of issuance of tax-exempt bonds, and no cost of the
Project to be reimbursed with the proceeds of the Reimbursement Bonds is a cost of
working capital.
Section 3.
Incidental Action. The appropriate officers of the County are
hereby authorized and directed to take or approve the taking of such actions as may be

264230.00KPF)
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necessary or appropriate in order to preserve the ability of the County to finance its
capital expenditures in accordance with the federal tax regulations and this Resolution.
Section 4.
No Replacement Proceeds. The County will not, at any time within
one year after any allocation of proceeds of the Reimbursement Bonds to reimburse any
expenditure, use the reimbursed funds to create a sinking fund for any issue of taxexempt bonds, or to otherwise replace the proceeds of any issue of tax-exempt bonds.
Section 5.
Effective Date: Repeal.
This Resolution shall take effect
immediately. All prior resolutions or portions thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby
repealed.
ADOPTED AND APPROVED this 7th day of August, 1996.

__

Chairman

TTEST:
W

^r"J

^

APPROVED AS TO fOffU

County Clerk

8tH L3M Countv Attorntvs Ofte*

ey

r/yyy?J
Oaoutv County Attorocv
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Wednesday. September IK 1996

COMMISSIONER OVERSON HASN'T ADDRESSED
CHARGES ABOUT GOLF COURSE
I am a member of the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah (CTU) and feel it is m\ duty as a
citizen of Salt Lake County to comment on the recent full-page ad placed in The Salt Lake Tribune
(Aug. 22) and Deseret News by our group. I, among others of our group, reviewed the ad prior to its
publication and agreed to its contents entirely.
In response to our ad. County' Commissioner Brent Overson contacted the press and local tele\ision
stations and held a press conference (Tribune, Aug. 23). At Overson's press conference he chose not
to address our group's concerns. Conversely, he attacked David Mast, chairman of Concerned
Taxpayers of Utah, personally.
It has proven quite difficult for a small non-profit organization to receive equal press coverage and
opportunity as reserved for public officials, namely Brent Overson. In addition, since the issues
raised by CTU were placed on the "back burner" in relation to Overson's personal attacks at the press
conference, he now enjoys the luxury of relying on his team of county attorneys to get him out of this
dilemma, at taxpayers' expense. I found it quite amazing that not one media or news representative
had questions about the allegations against Overson.
Personally, I left California after 16 years for the , ' kinder, more gentle" life in Utah. Illegal
immigration and generation after generation living on government programs continue to erode
California's fiscal strength. Utah's Legislature chose to squander most of our state's tax surplus last
year (especially considering the money wasn't theirs to spend), and ill-spent funds such as Overson's
South Mountain golf course proposal can send our swiftly growing economy into the same kind of
economic quandary.
The golf course in question is expected to be completed in 1998, and South Mountain developers
are contractually required to build it at their expense and dedicate it to Draper City as a public golf
course. Why, then, would the county even consider purchasing this course for $7 9 million or for any
price?
Dave Mast is one of the most scrupulous and empathetic men that I have had the fortune to meet.
His purpose and the purpose of CTU is the protection of our fellow taxpayers from waste and
corruption. Our group's questions to Salt Lake County and Brent Overson still remain unanswered,
and our request for incomplete and denied documents continues.
VINCENT VENTURA
Salt Lake City
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S.L. C O U N T Y DEFENDS FIXING OF W A G E S ON PALACE
PACTS
Judge troubled by talk of using project's jobs and pay as rewards for
favors.
Deseret News staff writer Joe Costanzo contributed to this article.
By Marianne Funk, Staff Writer

Attorneys for Salt Lake County told a state judge Monday that county officials can
legally require contractors working on the Salt Palace renovation to pay a
predetermined wage to subcontractors and employees.
But 3rd District Judge Richard Moffat was skeptical. Salt Lake County
Commissioner James Bradley's remarks about rewarding union workers for past
lobbying efforts by giving them plenty of work on the Salt Palace troubled the judge.
"It raises the question whether doing favors for unions or anyone else is any of the
county's business at all," Moffat said during a two-hour hearing on the matter.
Favoring union workers is not a valid motive for requiring predetermined wages identical to union wages - on the project.
In a sworn affidavit submitted to the court, Bradley admitted telling independent
contractors that the county wanted union workers to have a "presence" on the project
because the unions lobbied hard for the passage of the restaurant tax bill at the
Legislature.
But Bradley said such thanks was only one of several reasons for the predetermined
wage, said William Hyde, chief deputy of the civil division of the Salt Lake County
attorney's office. "It was one of many reasons discussed," he told Moffat.
Salt Lake County asked Moffat to dismiss a suit filed against the county by
Associated Builders and Contractors of Utah Inc. and Concerned Taxpayers for
Utah. The two groups challenged the county's right to require all contractors working
on the Salt Palace to pay specific wages and benefits to subcontractors and
employees. The county announced such plans in March, when it published bid
requirements contractors must follow.
Those bids must be turned in to the county by April 6. However, Moffat will not
likely rule on whether the predetermined wage is legal until the afternoon of April 5.
That not only gives contractors just 24 hours to modify bids they are preparing - if
the ruling requires it - but also could affect the county's financing. County officials
are traveling to New York City next week to arrange a $60 million bond package,
and they fear the litigation could have an adverse effect on interest rates.
If Moffat hasn't ruled by 4 p.m. on April 5, the independent contractors will be back
in his courtroom asking for a temporary re-strain-ing order halting the bid until the
judge has decided the issue, said Robert Babcock, attorney for the ABC.
Moffat expressed skepticism during Monday's hearing about the county's reasons
for requiring the higher wages. Hyde said the county wanted to ensure that workers
on the project receive decent wages. "We use a standard of decency: fair wage for
fair work."
The words didn't impress Moffat. "I don't buy the decency thing much," he said.
http://www.desnews.com/cgi-bin/libstory j)lus?dn_all&9403290124
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The county also required the higher wages to guarantee that only qualified workers
renovated the Salt Palace and to prevent strikes or walkouts. Well-paid workers are
less likely to walk off the job, Hyde told the judge.
Predetermined wages are a rather indirect way of controlling the quality of work,
aren't they, Moffat asked. "You can say to the contractor, 'You will do the job. We
will have inspectors on the site to see that you do,'" Moffat said. "Why should the
county get involved in the relationship between the contractors and their employees?"
Moffat also pointed out that well-paid workers have been known to walk offjobs as
frequently as lower-paid workers.
The court has no right to tell the county how to run its business, Hyde countered.
"If the court gets involved in making the decisions on these things, we'll be out of
business. We won't know which way to jump on these things."
Hyde cited several state laws that essentially give the county power to do what it
must do to run a safe and effective government.
Those powers don't include fixing wages, Babcock told Moffat. State law requires
governments to accept the lowest responsible bid on public works projects, he said.
Requiring predetermined wages runs afoul of that policy.
The Utah Legislature appropriated $15 million to the county for the Salt Palace
renovation but added the caveat that the county must give the work to the low bidder.
The county's plan to call for a predeterminated wage means that all bids will be high.
If what the county is doing is illegal, why isn't the state part of the lawsuit, Moffat
asked. "Because they are waiting to see what you do," Babcock responded. The
governor's staff is aware of the suit and troubled by the county's actions, he said.
Attorneys for both sides argued the matter for two hours, then told Moffat they
wanted to submit written briefs on the matter. ABC lawyers filed a lengthy brief with
the court Monday outlining reasons they believed Moffat should decide the suit in
ABC's favor.
County attorneys will file a reply to that brief on Thursday. ABC attorneys will file
a reply to the county's brief Friday morning.
Moffat was irritated with the lawyers for seeking the rest of the week to file briefs,
then telling him he must rule by early next week. "I'll try to do my damnedest," he
said. "But I think you are asking the impossible."
Hyde urged Moffat not to postpone the bidding past April 6. The county has already
booked several conventions in the Salt Palace, expecting it to be finished 610 days
after renovation begins. Those conventions will bring as many as 40,000 people to
Utah and millions of dollars into the state. In order to be done for those conventions,
work must begin April 15, Hyde told the judge.
"If they get an injunction (postponing the bids) they win the case," Hyde said.
And if they don't, the county wins, the judge retorted, "so don't point fingers at
them . . . I'll do what I can and maybe I'll have a decision by April 6."
© 1997 Deseret News Publishing Co.
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